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The recent conceptual achievement that the cortical motor system plays a 
crucial role not only in motor control but also in higher cognitive functions 
has given a new perspective also on the involvement of motor cortex in 
language perception and production. In particular, there is evidence that the 
matching mechanism based on mirror neurons can be involved in both pho-
nological recognition and retrieval of meaning, especially for action word 
categories, thus suggesting a contribution of an action–perception mecha-
nism to the automatic comprehension of semantics. Furthermore, a compari-
son of the anatomo-functional properties of the frontal motor cortex among 
different primates and their communicative modalities indicates that the 
combination of the voluntary control of the gestural communication systems 
and of the vocal apparatus has been the critical factor in the transition from 
a gestural-based communication into a predominantly speech-based system. 
Finally, considering that the monkey and human premotor-parietal motor 
system, plus the prefrontal cortex, are involved in the sequential motor org-
anization of actions and in the hierarchical combination of motor elements, 
we propose that elements of such motor organization have been exploited in 
other domains, including some aspects of the syntactic structure of language.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The aim of this article is to show the strong link existing between the motor 
system and language, with a particular emphasis on the relationship between the 
mirror neuron mechanism, thought to be involved in action understanding, and 
the mechanism underlying language comprehension. In order to address these 
issues, we have organized the current review as follows. First, we will describe 
the organization of the cortical motor system and how cognitive functions, and 
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more specifically, action understanding, derive from this organization. Second, 
we will review the evidence suggesting that the mirror matching mechanism can 
apply to phonological matching. Third, we will briefly describe vocal and 
gestural communication systems in non-human primates, suggesting that their 
combination at voluntary level can have played an important role in language 
evolution. Fourth, we will present the anatomical and neurophysiological 
evidence that suggests a homology between higher order monkey motor areas 
and frontal regions involved in language processing. We will conclude suggest-
ing the possible link between sequential motor behavior and syntactic structure. 
Although several issues of the debate concerning the role of the motor system in 
speech perception and language require a deeper elaboration of the different per-
spectives, we deliberately focus on the motor system and the action–perception 
mechanisms to emphasize their central contribution in different aspects of per-
ception processes occurring in language and to challenge a theoretical position in 
linguistics and cognitive sciences that considers sensory and motor information 
processes as separate domains.  
 
 
2. The Organization of the Motor System and the Emergence of Motor 
Cognitive Functions 
 
In the traditional way of conceiving brain processes, perception was considered 
the result of a higher order elaboration of sensory information, occurring in the 
posterior half of the brain. In this view, when we need to act on the external 
world, the outcome of this elaboration is fed to the anterior part of the cortex, the 
prefrontal and motor cortex, in order to plan actions and execute them. Thus, the 
posterior part of the cortex would have a main role in functions such as space 
perception and object perception, plus other cognitive functions, also considered 
as higher order elaboration of sensory functions, such as language comprehen-
sion, music, reasoning, memory, while the anterior part would simply guide our 
Behaviour. Although philosophers, psychologists, and neurophysiologists 
(Piaget 1951; Merleau-Ponty 1962; Jeannerod 1988) pointed to the motor system 
as to a fundamental tool for our knowledge of the world, for many years, this 
system was mainly considered in its executive aspects, such as, for example, 
movement parameters (Evarts 1968; Georgopoulos et al. 1982), or, at most, motor 
preparation (Weinrich et al. 1984). Interestingly, however, some researchers 
demonstrated that the motor cortex activates during motor imagery, which can 
be considered a mental function (Roland et al. 1980; Jeannerod 1994). Despite this 
evidence, the serial flow of information, i.e. from the so called associative areas of 
the temporal and parietal cortex to frontal areas, was not disputed, and also 
many computational models were organized according to this view (Poggio & 
Edelman 1990; Giese & Poggio 2003). In the last two decades the conceptu-
alization about action, perception and cognitive functions radically changed. The 
two most important new concepts that emerged are the assignment to the motor 
system of a crucial role in cognitive functions and, linked with it, the recognition 
of its strong importance in perception. These conceptual changes have been 
possible due to the neurophysiological, neuroanatomical and psychological 
L. Fogassi & P. F. Ferrari 
 
 
310 
findings achieved in the last two decades. Neurophysiological experiments in the 
monkey showed that the motor cortex code the goal of motor acts and contain a 
storage of high level motor representations. Neuroanatomical studies showed 
that parietal and frontal cortices are linked by reciprocal connections (Rizzolatti 
& Luppino 2001), thus indicating that these cortical regions have both motor and 
sensory properties and that motor and perceptual aspects are strictly integrated 
and influence each other. Finally, psychophysics studies in humans strengthen 
this suggestion, showing that not only higher order sensory elaboration 
influences the parameters of motor reactions, but, most importantly, motor repre-
sentations influence perceptual processes (Craighero et al. 1999; Loula et al. 2005; 
Casile & Giese 2006). The next section will concentrate on neurophysiological 
findings. 
 Single neuron recording studies allow to correlate the neuronal activity 
with the presentation of sensory stimuli or with specific behavioural events. 
Using this technique, it has been demonstrated that neurons of premotor cortex 
(Brodmann’s area 6) activate during goal-related motor acts, such as reaching, 
pushing, grasping, manipulating, breaking, etc., rather than during simple 
movements, such as, for example, arm extension or fingers flexion. In particular, 
single neurons of ventral premotor area F5 code various levels of abstraction of 
motor acts. Some activate when a monkey executes motor acts such as grasping, 
manipulating, holding, tearing objects (Rizzolatti et al. 1988). Within the category 
of grasping neurons, some discharge when the monkey grasps food with the 
hand or the mouth, or when the same goal is achieved not only with the 
biological effector but also with a tool, after a period of motor training to use it 
(Umiltà et al. 2008). All these studies strongly demonstrate that the main role of 
the motor cortex is that of coding goals. The neurons coding these goals form, 
together, a ‘storage’ of motor representations, a kind of ‘internal motor know-
ledge’ of the individual. Coming back to the motor imagery function (see above), 
whenever an individual imagines to perform a motor act, the activation of the 
motor cortex reflects the activation of specific motor representations. Notably, for 
the occurrence of this function a previous activity of posterior, sensory or 
associative cortices, is not required. 
 Usually, our behavior occurs in response to sensory stimuli. Therefore, 
based on the above described motor organization, in order to transform a sensory 
input into a motor output, the former must be associated to the appropriate 
motor representation. This is possible through the anatomical connections 
between parietal and motor cortex. Note that this link ensures two functions: (i) 
the transformation of an external input (e.g., an object) into a motor format (e.g., 
grasping) and (ii) a sensorimotor matching mechanism, providing an automatic 
attribution of motor meaning to the sensory input addressing a specific motor 
representation. Neurophysiological studies demonstrated that this double 
function is present in several circuits (Rizzolatti & Luppino 2001). For example, a 
circuit linking an area of intraparietal cortex (anterior intraparietal area, AIP) 
with an area of ventral premotor cortex (area F5) is involved in transforming the 
physical object properties in grasping motor acts. At the same time, the visual 
response of F5 neurons to object presentation appears to derive from a 
mechanism matching the object visual characteristics with the corresponding 
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motor representations (the grip used to grasp that object). Thus, this neuronal 
visual response represents a pragmatic description of the object because the 
object is described in motor terms. Another example of a sensorimotor matching 
process that allows individuals to achieve a specific understanding of the 
external world is the mirror matching mechanism. The system based on this 
mechanism in monkeys and humans will be described in the next section. 
 In conclusion, the existence of a variety of sensorimotor matching 
mechanisms suggest that these systems have been selected in the phylogenesis 
because of their pragmatic role and their capacity to perform two functions: 
sensorimotor integration and achievement of a motor knowledge of the external 
world. 
 
2.1. Mirror Neurons in the Monkey 
 
Mirror neurons were first discovered in area F5 (see Fig.1A) of the monkey 
ventral premotor cortex (Di Pellegrino et al. 1992; Gallese et al. 1996; Ferrari et al. 
2003) and then in area PFG in the rostral part of the inferior parietal lobule 
(Gallese et al. 2002; Fogassi et al. 2005; Rozzi et al. 2008). Since the properties of 
mirror neurons of F5 and PFG are similar, we will describe them together. These 
neurons discharge when the monkey performs a hand or mouth goal-directed 
motor act (e.g., grasping, biting, tearing or manipulating an object), and when it 
observes the same, or a similar, act performed by the experimenter or by another 
monkey. They do not respond to the simple object presentation (differently from 
the neurons of the AIP-F5 circuit) and to the vision of the hand mimicking the 
motor act without the target. Notably, the motor acts effective in eliciting the 
mirror neurons response are the same as those coded by purely motor neurons, 
that is they correspond to the different goal types stored in ventral premotor and 
inferior parietal cortex. 
 The finding that mirror neurons respond visually to the presentation of a 
hand (or mouth) — object interaction strongly suggest that these neurons code 
the goal of the observed motor acts. This suggestion is corroborated by the results 
of two investigations. In the first it has been shown that mirror neurons 
discharged both when the monkey could fully observe a grasping act and when 
it could see only part of it because the hand-target interaction was hidden behind 
a screen (Umiltà et al. 2001). The access to memory of the object, combined with 
the vision of the reaching component of the act, allows the retrieval of the motor 
representation of the partially observed motor act and of its consequences. Thus, 
it has been concluded that the neuronal discharge obtained in the partially 
occluded condition codes the goal of the act, even though its target is not visible. 
 In the second study, monkey had to both observe motor acts (breaking, 
manipulating, dropping) and listen to the sound of these noisy acts, while the 
response of mirror neurons was recorded (Kohler et al. 2002) The results showed 
that a sub-category of them discharged not only during motor act observation 
but also during pure listening to the sound produced by that act (‘audio-visual 
mirror neurons’). This indicates that the content (the goal) of the motor act can be 
accessed, and therefore coded, through different sensory modalities. Although 
the response of most mirror neurons is independent of many details of the 
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observed act, such as space, type of object or hand, recently two studies have 
demonstrated that part of mirror neurons can provide also information on the 
visual details. 
 In the first study (Caggiano et al. 2009) the visual response of mirror 
neurons have been analyzed during observation of an experimenter grasping a 
piece of food within the monkey reaching space (peripersonal space), or far from 
the monkey (extrapersonal space). The study showed that half of the tested 
mirror neurons responded better in one of the two conditions, the two sub-
categories (peri- and extrapersonal neurons) being equally represented. This 
finding suggests that mirror neurons can code others’ actions within different 
spaces, possibly in relation to the possibility to socially interact with others by 
performing different types of behavioural responses.  
 In a second study (Caggiano et al. 2011), the responses of F5 mirror neurons 
were investigated during observation of movies showing grasping motor acts 
seen from different perspectives (frontal, lateral, egocentric). The first interesting 
result of this study was that mirror neurons respond also to acts presented in 
movies, although the same motor acts, presented naturalistically, evoked a 
higher visual response. The second result was that while one quarter of the 
recorded mirror neurons responded to the visual presentation of motor acts in 
movies, independent of the visual perspective from which they were presented, 
the other three-quarters of neurons were tuned to specific visual perspectives. 
 Altogether, the two studies indicate that there are mirror neurons whose 
function is only that of encoding the goal of a motor act, while others, beyond 
this property, can also contribute to provide the observer with the details of the 
observed act, probably through feedback connections between motor cortex and 
posterior, higher order, visual areas. This mechanism, which is supported by the 
presence of reciprocal connections between anterior and posterior cortical areas, 
would explain a way in which motor representations and the corresponding 
sensory representations mutually interact. 
 The encoding property of a neuron can be read only from its output, i.e. 
from its discharge. A neuron has only a single output, meaning that it produces 
only one code. Since, however, its output depends on the integration of several 
inputs, it is important to know which of these inputs can drive a certain output 
and which cannot. In the case of mirror neurons, this input-output comparison 
becomes an analysis of the congruence between the observed and the executed 
motor act. This analysis leads to conclude that ninety percent of mirror neurons 
are congruent in terms of goal (Gallese et al. 1996; Rozzi et al. 2008). However, this 
congruence may be strict or broad. In ‘strictly congruent’ mirror neurons the 
observed and executed motor acts correspond both in the goal and the details of 
the act. In ‘broadly congruent’ mirror neurons there is also congruence of the 
goal but, for example, the range of observed motor acts effective in eliciting the 
visual response can be broader with respect to that of motor acts effective during 
execution. The congruence property of mirror neurons is very important for 
several reasons. The first is that the congruence manifests the occurrence of an 
efficient matching mechanism, which is the basis for understanding others’ 
actions. In other words, the observation of a specific motor act performed by 
another individual elicits the activation of the corresponding motor represen-
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tation in the motor system of the observer, as if he was executing the same act. 
Note that, during observation, an inhibitory mechanism must come into play, 
blocking the automatic execution of the observed act (see Kraskov et al. 2009). 
Second, a strict congruence can be very important if these neurons must be used 
in imitative processes (see below). Third, a broad congruence can be very helpful 
for the generalization of the meaning of the observed motor act. This aspect was 
confirmed by two studies showing that some mirror neurons can begin to 
respond also during observation of motor acts performed with tools, provided a 
long visual exposure to these acts (Ferrari et al. 2005) or after training to use these 
tools (Umiltà et al. 2008). Fourth, observation/execution matching can be very 
useful during social learning processes such as those occurring during language 
development. 
 Which is the source of visual information that contributes to the formation 
of the mirror matching mechanism? It is known that in the anterior part of the 
monkey superior temporal sulcus (STSa) there are neurons that fire during 
observation of biological movements, among which also hand motor acts (Perrett 
et al. 1989). These high order visual neurons are considered the source of visual 
input for parietal mirror neurons and, as a consequence, for ventral premotor 
mirror neurons. Note that both STSa and PFG, on one side, and PFG and F5, on 
the other, are reciprocally connected (Rozzi et al. 2006; Bonini et al. 2010), while 
there is no direct connection between STSa and F5. Thus, it is not known where is 
the first place where matching may occur. 
 
2.2. The Mirror System in Humans 
 
After the discovery of mirror neurons in the monkey, the presence of a mirror 
system (MS) in humans has been demonstrated with electrophysiological and 
neuroimaging techniques. For example, the transcranial magnetic stimulation 
(TMS) technique, that allows either to excite or to inactivate limited cortical 
regions, enabled several researchers to demonstrate the existence of a mirror 
matching system at the level of the motor cortex. In fact, if a TMS pulse at 
threshold intensity is given to the motor cortex of subjects observing motor acts 
performed by another individual, it is possible to enhance the electromyographic 
activation of the same muscles that would be active if the subjects themselves 
would perform the observed motor act (Fadiga et al. 1995, Gangitano et al. 2004). 
This enhancement is justified only if the stimulated region is pre-activated by 
observation. 
 While TMS provided indication of the occurrence of a matching 
mechanism, positron emission tomography (PET) and functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) techniques allowed to identify the anatomical location 
of areas active during observation of motor acts. Since up to now several brain 
imaging studies have been carried out on this topic, we will limit to sum up all 
these results. The main areas activated during observation are: A region around 
the superior temporal sulcus (STS), one in the supramarginal gyrus (part of the 
inferior parietal lobule, IPL), and a third in the ventral premotor cortex plus the 
posterior sector of the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), namely areas area 44 and 45 
that, in the left hemisphere, correspond to Broca’s area (the ‘speech’ area) (see for 
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review Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia 2009; Caspers et al. 2010). In many of these studies 
it has been underlined that the areas activated in IFG and IPL correspond 
anatomically to the areas where mirror neurons have been found in monkeys (F5 
and PFG, respectively). In addition, the STS region corresponds to the monkey 
area described by Perrett et al. (1989), which is active only during observation of a 
motor act, but not during its execution. Among activated areas can also be 
included the anterior intraparietal area (AIP) — corresponding to the monkey 
area having approximately the same location — that is mainly activated by 
observation of hand motor acts (Shmuelof & Zohari 2008), and, in some studies, 
regions of the dorsal premotor cortex and superior parietal lobule, that can 
become active during observation of reaching motor acts (Filimon et al. 2007). 
 Finally, electroencephalographic (EEG) and magnetoencephalographic 
(MEG) studies were very useful not only to confirm the activation of the frontal 
cortex during action observation (Cochin et al. 1999; Nishitani & Hari 2000), but 
also to show the time course of activation. In fact, it has been shown that, after 
activation of the occipital lobe, the activation of IFG precedes that of precentral 
cortex. 
 In monkeys, MNs respond exclusively or stronger to goal-directed acts 
than to intransitive movements, the only exception being communicative MNs 
(see below). Differently from monkey studies, in humans also the observation of 
meaningless movements can elicit an activation of areas belonging to the motor 
system. For example, TMS studies showed that observation of meaningless 
movements determine a resonance in the motor cortex (Fadiga et al. 1995). Some 
neuroimaging studies showed that observation of meaningless movements 
activate a dorsal premotor-parietal circuit (Grèzes et al. 1998), others show that 
observation of mimed motor acts activate the same premotor, IFG and parietal 
regions activated by the goal-directed ones (Grèzes et al. 1998; Buccino et al. 2001). 
Interestingly, observation of symbolic gestures appear to activate both ventral 
premotor and inferior parietal cortex, but this latter activation involves more 
posterior sectors than those activated by observation of goal-directed motor acts 
(Lui et al. 2008). Thus, observation of non goal-directed movements may activate 
areas belonging to the MS, and these areas may be different depending on 
whether the observed movements are meaningful or meaningless. 
 Interestingly, it has been claimed that intransitive gestures (pantomimes) 
play a very important role in language evolution, because they facilitated the 
transition from object-related actions to intentional movements to “protosign, a 
manual-based communication system that broke through the fixed repertoire of 
primate vocalizations to yield an open repertoire of communicative gestures” 
(Arbib 2005: 107).  
 
2.3. The Involvement of the Mirror System in Imitation 
 
A very interesting issue, strictly related to the properties of mirror neurons and 
very important for human learning and evolution of language, is that of 
imitation. In adult monkeys there are no clear reports of this behavior, in parti-
cular of imitation learning (Visalberghi & Fragaszy 2002). Thus, in these species, 
the mirror neuron system, besides providing individuals with the capacity of 
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understanding actions, can be perhaps exploited for imitative processes such as 
neonatal imitation and action facilitation (Ferrari et al. 2009, 2012). In humans, 
however, the imitative function, and specifically imitation learning, is very well 
developed and is critical particularly during language acquisition in children. 
Many brain imaging studies carried out in the last decade, showed that the 
parieto-premotor mirror system is activated when subjects are required to 
observe and imitate simple finger movements, goal-related motor acts and 
complex action sequences (Buccino et al. 2004; see for review Iacoboni 2009). 
Thus, observation and imitation share the same neural circuits. In fact, during 
imitation learning, a crucial step is represented by the recognition of the motor 
acts belonging to the action to be imitated. This step is very likely accomplished 
by mirror neurons. A second step concerns the internal reconstruction of the 
sequence of motor acts to be reproduced. Is this a property of mirror neurons or 
is performed by other cortical regions? An fMRI experiment in which subjects 
were required to observe novel guitar chords performed by an expert player and 
then to imitate them (Buccino et al. 2004), show, beyond that of the parieto-frontal 
mirror neuron system, a strong activation of the middle frontal cortex (area 46) 
during the phase interleaved between observation and imitation. In this phase 
the subject has to decompose the action into its basic motor elements and then 
subsequently recombining them into a new action matching the observed one. 
This is probably the role of prefrontal cortex, known to be crucial in action 
planning, attention and working memory. 
 
 
3. Matching Sounds with Actions 
 
The acoustic signal generated by a biological event is the result of a motor act. 
This motor act corresponds to a specific motor representation stored in the 
cortical motor system. When this signal, either a phoneme, a word or a sentence, 
is listened by another individual, a series of neuronal processes are taking place 
in the brain, starting from the auditory pathway but not ending into the primary 
auditory cortex and higher order acoustic areas. In fact, many neurophysiological 
investigations clearly show that part of this information reaches premotor cortex 
and connects with a specific motor representation (for a review, see Pulvermüller 
& Fadiga 2010). The activation of this motor representation, in turn, is crucial for 
the production of the same acoustic signal.  
 The described process can be considered similar to that occurring in a 
linguistic interaction between a sender and a receiver. Although the linguistic 
signal has a specific pattern and characteristics that distinguish it from an action 
sound or a physical sound, nevertheless also in this domain the matching 
mechanism can operate similarly to that occurring during listening to an action 
sound. As a matching mechanism allows the understanding of an action 
meaning, the same mechanism allows the understanding of a phoneme. Thus, a 
syllable is not understood simply because of the perception of its acoustic 
features, but because these features retrieve an invariant motor representation. 
Interestingly, during the first year of life, infants demonstrate an increased 
sensitivity to phonological properties and during the babbling phase it is likely 
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that the articulation of sounds and the first produced phonemes play an 
important part not only in sensorimotor association but also in strengthening and 
mapping neuroanatomical connections between acoustic areas and cortical motor 
representations involved in sounds production (Pulvermüller & Fadiga 2010). 
 This proposal of a ‘pragmatic’ and embodied understanding of spoken 
words resembles very much the motor theory of speech perception (Liberman & 
Mattingly 1985), postulating that “the objects of speech perception are the intend-
ed phonetic gestures of the speaker, represented in the brain as invariant motor 
commands” (p. 2). From these considerations two important implications follow: 
(i) Speech (and maybe language) understanding can be rooted on a motor 
ground and (ii) the mechanism matching the auditory and motor representation 
of an utterance can subserve both phonological matching and the retrieval of the 
associated meaning. This would constitute a motor-based mechanism for auto-
matic comprehension of semantics. 
 A series of behavioral and neuroscientific studies support these two claims. 
One of the first demonstrations of a phonological motor-based matching system 
is that of Fadiga et al. (2002), who recorded motor evoked potentials (MEPs) from 
the tongue muscles by stimulating with TMS the left motor cortex of normal 
volunteers instructed to listen to acoustically presented words and pseudo-
words, containing either a double ‘f’ or a double ‘r’, that require a different 
tongue muscles involvement to be pronounced (stronger during words contain-
ing double ‘r’). The TMS pulse was given at the time in which the double conso-
nant was produced by the speaker. The results showed that listening to words 
and pseudo-words containing the double ‘r’ determined a significant increase of 
the amplitude of MEPs recorded from the tongue muscles with respect to listen-
ing to words and pseudo-words containing the double ‘f’ and bitonal sounds. 
Furthermore, the tongue muscle activation during word listening was higher 
than that during listening to pseudo-words. These data strongly suggest that 
phonology and perhaps, partly, semantics, are processed within the motor sys-
tem. In a related TMS experiments, Watkins et al. (2003) stimulated the face 
motor field of subjects listening to speech or viewing speech-related lip move-
ments, as compared to listening to non-verbal sounds and viewing eyes and 
brow movements. The results show that, compared to control conditions, listen-
ing to and viewing speech enhanced the size of MEPs. 
 In a more recent experiment (D’Ausilio et al. 2009) TMS pulses were given 
to the lip and tongue cortical motor fields while subjects listened to phonemes 
produced with the lips (b and p) and the tongue (d and t) and performed a 
phoneme discrimination task. The TMS pulses were applied just before stimulus 
presentation to selectively prime the cortical activity specifically in the lip or 
tongue representations, with the hypothesis to obtain a bias in perception. 
Results showed that indeed the stimulation of a given motor representation led 
to a better performance in recognizing speech sounds produced with the 
concordant effector compared with discordant sounds produced with a different 
effector. 
 These and other studies clearly support the view that the motor system 
contributes to the identification and discrimination of speech sounds. However, 
the investigations reviewed so far have described the involvement of the motor 
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system at the phonological level. Is there any evidence that during listening to a 
word the premotor and primary motor cortex are involved, thus contributing to 
the comprehension of the meaning? 
 There is some evidence suggesting that the meaning of a word can be 
indeed processed in these areas. Functional MRI studies demonstrated that pure 
listening to action verbs or action-related sentences produces an effector specific, 
somatotopic, activation of the motor cortex (Hauk et al. 2004; Tettamanti et al. 
2005), similar to that found by Buccino et al. (2001) during observation of motor 
acts performed with the mouth, the hand or the foot. In all these cases, as in the 
above reported TMS studies, listening to action-related verbal material produced 
an enhancement of motor cortical activation. On the contrary, Buccino et al. 
(2005), using TMS, found a suppression of motor activity while stimulating either 
the hand or the foot/leg motor area of the left hemisphere, while participants 
were listening to sentences expressing hand and foot actions. They found a 
decrease of MEPs amplitude when the stimulated field corresponded to the 
effector involved in the listened action. A complementary reaction time study, in 
which subjects had to respond with the hand or the foot to the same sentences, 
confirmed this suppression effect. If, on one side, these data demonstrate an 
effector specific modulation of the motor system during listening to action-
related material, on the other side, this modulation is consistent with an 
inhibition effect. Following one of the authors’ interpretations, it is plausible that 
the motor representation elicited by listening to the sentence interfered with the 
motor program activated in order to respond with the required same effector. 
 Interestingly, although it has been suggested that the activation of the 
inferior frontal areas during action-verb listening is not related to a process of 
meaning comprehension (Hickok 2009), other studies contradict this view. In fact 
patients with motor neuron disease or lesions in the left inferior frontal cortex 
have deficits in action-verb understanding and in semantic understanding of 
pictures depicting actions (Bak et al. 2001, 2006). 
 It must be noted however, that several words are not related to verbs and 
describe, for example, categories of objects or abstract concepts that are unrelated 
to actions. In these cases, brain imaging studies have shown activations in areas 
of the temporal lobe, thus suggesting that the motor links in the semantic proces-
sing is limited to words related to actions (see Pulvermüller & Fadiga 2010). 
 Altogether, these and other findings support the idea of a strong embodi-
ment of speech during acoustic processing, both at phonological and semantic 
level. However, other theoretical approaches contrast with this view (see, for 
example, Hickok 2009; Lotto et al. 2009). Their arguments are against a main role 
of the motor system in general and of the mirror system in particular, in speech 
perception. They report, for example, that infants could discriminate speech 
sounds that they could not yet produce (Eimas et al. 1971). Furthermore, Broca’s 
aphasia does not seem to prevent normal receptive speech ability (Damasio 1992; 
Goodglass 1993). Furthermore, there are data of double dissociation in Broca’s 
aphasics showing that there are patients impaired in syllables discrimination but 
as good as normal in word comprehension and other patients that, although 
impaired in speech discrimination, can be good in repeating heard speech (see 
Hickok & Poeppel 2007 and Lotto et al. 2009 for review). Note, however, that 
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other studies aimed at investigating how deep were the impairments in speech 
comprehension in these patients, found that some deficits were evident 
especially in single-word comprehension (Utman et al. 2001; Yee et al. 2008; see 
Pulvermüller & Fadiga 2010). 
 About the role of the motor system in the comprehension of semantics, the 
critics of the ‘motor’ approach, although recognizing that its involvement has 
been shown by several works, maintain that, instead of being central to language 
understanding, it could play a post-recognition epiphenomenal role (see Hickok 
2009). 
 Altogether, these data suggest that the proposal concerning the 
involvement of the motor system in speech perception warrants more attention 
concerning how central is its role and clearly this requires further investigations 
to better understand the underlying neural mechanisms. 
 
 
4. Vocal and Gestural Communication 
 
It is broadly accepted that several aspects of human language rely on basic 
elements that are shared with other animals. However, it is still a matter of 
debate which feature belongs exclusively to language (Hauser et al. 2002). Vocal 
communication in nonhuman primates has been often compared to human 
language in an effort to understand possible commonalities and the basic 
components from which human language might have emerged (Ghazanfar & 
Hauser 1999; Seyfarth & Cheney 2010). Undoubtedly, monkeys can emit utter-
ances in different contexts to signal urgent events such as the presence of preda-
tors or food, or to threat a conspecific during a dispute. The seminal study by 
Cheney & Seyfarth (1982) showed that vervet monkeys are capable of referential 
communication, providing information through alarm calls to conspecifics about 
the different types of predators approaching. Recipients seem to understand the 
different meaning of the call or, as demonstrated in other studies, are able to take 
into account the possible causes of the alarm calls (Zuberbühler 2000). 
 The signs of flexibility in the vocalization systems of many nonhuman 
primate species is supported by their capacity to modify their utterances based 
on their assessment of the possible consequence they produce on other 
individuals. This phenomenon, named the audience effect, demonstrates the 
capacity of monkeys and apes to modify their vocalizations depending on the 
social context (Caine et al. 1995; Tomasello & Zuberbühler 2002). More recently, it 
has been demonstrated that wild chimpanzees emit alarm calls with low or high 
frequency based on the state of knowledge of the group member about a danger 
(Crockford et al. 2012). These data suggest that in some nonhuman primates it 
has been developed a capacity to control vocalization to inform group members 
depending on the information available to them about environmental dangers. 
 In terms of learning, nonhuman primates vocalization shows a certain 
degree of flexibility. For example some species display population-specific vocal 
signals and in the course of ontogeny there are modifications in the structure of 
their vocalization and in their capacity to use it in the appropriate context 
(Tomasello & Zuberbühler 2002; Egnor & Hauser 2006). However, cross-fostering 
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studies demonstrate that the capacity to learn new vocalizations is very limited 
(Owren et al. 1993). Furthermore, this limitation has also been supported by 
several experimental studies showing that monkeys and apes cannot learn 
completely new vocal patterns (see Yamaguchi & Izumi 2008). This is illustrated, 
for example, by the failure in teaching human spoken language to apes, even 
though some of the basic cognitive components that are found in language (e.g., 
use of signs or symbols for communication) are present, as it has been clearly 
demonstrated by the old experiments involving symbolic communication 
teaching by means of keyboards (Gardner & Gardner 1969; Patterson 1978; 
Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 1986). 
 One of the main reasons of the limited flexibility in the vocal patterns may 
stem from a limited capacity in voluntarily controlling the vocal apparatus. 
Although behavioral studies have demonstrated that macaque monkeys can 
achieve a significant level of voluntary vocal control when submitted to operant 
conditioning tasks (Sutton et al. 1973; Aitken &Wilson 1979; Hihara et al. 2003; 
Yamaguchi & Izumi 2008), the success rate of vocal training studies remains vari-
able (Yamaguchi & Myers 1972; Pierce 1985). In a recent experiment we demon-
strated that when macaques are subjected to an intensive training aimed at 
emitting coo calls, they are capable to reach a significant level of success (Coudè 
et al. 2011) However, it also emerged that often the monkeys were able to modify 
correctly the mouth configuration but showed difficulties in sound emission, 
thus suggesting that in macaque monkeys there is only a partial voluntary con-
trol and coordination of the mouth together with the larynx muscles.  
 
4.1. Gestures in Monkeys and Apes 
 
In one of our previous review we proposed the terms gesture to describe both 
goal-related actions (e.g., grasping an object with the hand) and communicative 
oro-facial and brachio-manual movements devoid of an explicit target (Fogassi & 
Ferrari 2007). Some scholars make different distinctions about what is gesture, 
emphasizing the motor ineffectiveness, the persistence and the role of gaze etc. 
(Call & Tomasello 2007). We are not going to cover all the theoretical accounts 
that define a gesture but instead we would like to make an attempt in 
understanding the possible link at the neurological level between the control of a 
movement directed to a target (i.e. a motor act) and the intentional movement 
that is directed toward another individual which has a communicative meaning. 
There are several converging evidence from neuroscience, ethology, and devel-
opmental psychology that many of the gestures displayed by nonhuman 
primates began their existence as actions devoid of a communicative function, 
but over time they became co-opted and transformed into communicative 
devices that accomplished similar functions (Fogassi & Ferrari 2007; Liebal & Call 
2012). Probably, only at a later stage in primate and hominin evolution the 
vocalization system has been integrated in such gestural system, and in our 
species we can testify the presence of such ancestral linkage (Corballis 2003). 
 It’s outside the scope of our review to provide a full account of gestural 
communication in nonhuman primates as it has been already extensively covered 
elsewhere (Liebal et al. 2004; Liebal & Call 2012). However, what is relevant for 
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the current work is to describe some aspects of this type of communication in 
relation to neurological mechanisms and language evolution. Gestures can 
involve the oro-facial and/or the brachio-manual system in conjunction with 
body postures. Although some of the facial gestures are elicited by less urgent 
contingent situation, they often involve face-to-face exchanges, involuntary acts 
and autonomic responses. Some of these gestures have been extensively studied 
by comparative investigations that could reconstruct, with reliable approxi-
mation, their possible relatedness and origin among the different species (van 
Hooff 1962, 1967). Some of these, we believe, might be particularly relevant for 
the current topic. For example, lipsmacking has been described in several Old 
World primate species. It is characterized by regular cycles of vertical jaw move-
ment, often involving a parting of the lips, but sometimes occurring with closed, 
puckered lips and sometimes alternated with tongue protrusions. Importantly, as 
a communication signal, the lipsmack is always directed at another individual to 
signal affiliative and benevolent intentions and it is displayed during face-to-face 
interactions in which both individuals might lipsmack at each other (Maestripieri 
1996; Ferrari et al. 2009; Morrill et al. 2012). Interestingly, this behavior is one of 
the first to emerge in the course of ontogeny and undergoes into changes both in 
the pattern and in the frequency with which it is emitted (Ferrari et al. 2009). We 
have recently found that in rhesus macaques, infants produce lipsmacking at a 
slower frequency than adults and that these cyclic movements become faster and 
less variable with age (Morrill et al. 2012). We also found that other cyclic 
movements like chewing do not follow similar developmental patterns. We 
proposed that the development of lipsmacking follows a trajectory that resembles 
that of babbling in humans. 
 From an evolutionary perspective it has been proposed that some commu-
nicative gestures such as lips-smacking and pucker face very likely evolved from 
movements aimed to remove and eat particles, such as skin parasites, from the 
fur of group mates during grooming sessions. This suggestion is corroborated by 
the observation that the beginning of a grooming session can be preceded or 
accompanied by a lips-smacking action without ingestion (see Van Hooff 1962, 
1967; Maestripieri 1996). Through a process of ritualization, an ingestive action 
could have lost its behavioral meaning related to feeding and achieved an 
affiliative meaning. Together, these evolutionary and ontogenetic accounts seem 
to be in agreement with the proposal by MacNeilage (1998) that the rhythmic 
cyclic mandibular open-close alternation produced during infant babbling might 
have evolved from rhythmic mouth movement of our ancestral primates. 
 Concerning brachio-manual gestural communication, apes use them in a 
richer and more elaborated way than monkeys (Call & Tomasello 2007). In the 
last few years there has been an increasing body of research, in part stimulated 
by the idea that brachio-manual gestures have probably played a role in 
language evolution (Liebal & Call 2012). Apes, for example, are capable to use 
several types of gestures, often in combination, to request for food (Leavens et al. 
2004, 2005; Gomez 2007). In captivity, chimpanzees and also some monkeys point 
to request food or objects and, in the case of chimpanzees, they are sensitive to 
the attentional state of the human experimenter when they point. Although they 
do not gesture to share information or to inform others, it has been pointed out 
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that they might use brachio-manual gestures in many flexible ways. Under 
human rearing conditions some apes have been reported to use declarative 
gestures, thus showing the potential to expand their cognitive and contextual use 
of the communicative gestures (Lyn et al. 2011). 
 Another important aspect of gestural communication is the possibility to 
perform sequences and to combine them with other communicative signals such 
as face gestures and vocalization. The issue of sequencing has been investigated 
in a few studies on apes (Liebal et al. 2004; Pollick & de Waal 2007). Chimpanzees 
can use hands gesture sequences producing signals in one or more modalities 
(visual, auditory, or tactile) (Liebal et al. 2004). Although the sequences could 
involve the repetition of the same gesture, it has been noted that several were 
composed by three or more different gestures. Most of them were used in a play 
context but other sequences were often used in more diverse situations. 
Sometimes the use of the sequence was the result of the failure to gather the 
recipient attention (Liebal et al. 2004). Other studies demonstrate that chimpan-
zees can often display attention-gather hand gestures in combination with sound 
production (Leavens et al. 2004). More recently, the use of these combinations has 
been extensively studied in chimpanzees and bonobos (Pollick & de Waal 2007). 
The results showed that brachio-manual gestures were more flexible across con-
texts than the facial/vocal communicative ones. The former appear to be less tied 
to incipient events that may induce high emotional responses than facial gestures 
and vocalization. These authors conclude that very likely the flexibility of brachio-
manual gestures might have played a central role as a prerequisite model for 
language evolution. This would be also supported by other data showing that 
apes can imitate brachio-manual gestures and by the report of population-speci-
ficity of some of these gestures. However, one of the limitations in these studies 
is that they have been carried out on animals living in captivity where both the 
exposure to humans and the weak ecological value in displaying the full-range of 
communicative behaviors could limit our knowledge on the natural com-
binatorial use of different gestures and vocalization in the perspective of lang-
uage evolution. 
 
 
5. Anatomo-Functional Homologies between Monkey Premotor Cortex and 
Human Broca’s Area 
 
The relation between the mirror neuron system and language is corroborated by 
comparative data. We will briefly summarize the main evidence of such 
homology. First, cytoarchitectonic data suggest that dysgranular area 44 (the pos-
terior part of Broca’s area) and monkey area F5 share similar features (Petrides & 
Pandya 1994; Rizzolatti & Arbib 1998) (see Fig. 1 below). Although some authors 
have emphasized the anatomical characteristics of monkey area 44 (located, 
according to Petrides et al. (2005), in the fundus of the inferior limb of arcuate 
sulcus) as a possible precursor of human 44, neurophysiological recordings pro-
vided evidence that the whole rostral part of ventral premotor cortex in monkeys 
has typical features (see below) that are shared with those recently described for 
Broca’s area. 
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 Second, area F5 contains motor neurons related to the execution of both 
hand and/or mouth actions. Similarly, brain imaging experiments in humans 
demonstrated that Broca’s area, traditionally considered as a ‘speech’ area, is also 
involved in hand movement tasks such as complex finger movements, mental 
imagery of grasping actions, and hand imitation tasks (see Rizzolatti et al. 2009). 
 Third, a recent neurophysiological study showed that in the lateral part of 
area F5 there are neurons specifically activated during conditioned vocalization 
(Coudé et al. 2011, see below), suggesting its possible role in the evolution of 
voluntary controlled phonation. These findings are relatively surprising because 
it is known that ventral premotor cortex contains a representation of the larynx 
(Hast et al. 1974; Simonyan & Jurgens 2003). 
 Fourth, both areas are considered to be the rostral pole of the mirror 
neuron system. In fact, the evidence reviewed above demonstrates that Broca’s 
area, as F5 mirror neurons, is activated when subjects observe goal-related hand 
and mouth motor acts done by another individual (see Rizzolatti et al. 2009). 
Furthermore, in accord with the presence of F5 mirror neurons responding to the 
sound of motor acts (Kohler et al. 2002), also the human left motor cortex is 
activated when subjects listen to sounds associated with motor acts (Aziz-Zadeh 
et al. 2004; Gazzola et al. 2006; Ricciardi et al. 2009). 
 Fifth, in agreement with the presence of oro-facial communicative mirror 
neurons in F5, Broca’s area activates when subjects observe silent speech 
(Buccino et al. 2004b). 
 Summing up, in monkey premotor cortex there are several features that can 
pre-adapt this cortical sector for the evolution of a sophisticated communicative 
system. The core of these features consists in encoding the production and 
perception of both oro-facial and forelimb gestures in the same cortical area. This 
double control, once integrated with that of vocalization, would have constituted 
the basis for a communicative system with an increased complexity and effici-
ency, and a higher level of flexibility in transferring information to conspecifics. 
 
5.1. Toward the Integration of Vocalization with Gestures 
 
Nonhuman primate vocal behavior was traditionally assumed to be predomi-
nantly emotional (Seyfart & Cheney 1997; Fitch 2000; Premack 2004) and mainly 
consisting of involuntary or reflexive responses. However, several investigations 
partly contrast this view showing that monkeys can achieve a significant level of 
voluntary vocal control when submitted to operant conditioning tasks (Sutton et 
al. 1973; Aitken & Wilson 1979; Hihara et al. 2003). 
 From a neurophysiological perspective vocal production in nonhuman pri-
mates is considered to be controlled by the brainstem and by mesial cortical areas 
which, besides other functions, are also involved in emotional behavior (West & 
Larson 1995; Izumi et al. 2001; Jurgens 2002). We have recently challenged this 
view with a study (Coudé et al. 2011) in which we recorded from ventral 
premotor cortex of macaques trained to control simple calls (i.e. coo-calls). The 
results showed that the rostro-lateral part of PMv (mostly area F5) contains 
neurons that fire during conditioned but not during spontaneous vocalization. 
Interestingly, in the majority of these neurons the discharge begun before sound 
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onset, thus suggesting their causal relation with vocal production. Furthermore, 
these neurons have been found intermingled with other neurons controlling 
mouth and hand motor acts, and with mirror neurons. The link of these neurons 
with the motor control of vocalization has been also supported by the electrical 
microstimulation of this sector, which in some cases elicited larynx contraction. 
 Interestingly, although it is known that acoustic input related to motor acts 
reaches area F5, we did not find neurons that, beyond their responses during 
vocalization, responded also during listening to the same or a similar call. This 
could be due to the fact that while in monkeys during face-to-face gestural com-
munication there is a frequent exposure to oro-facial gestures of their conspecifics 
with reciprocal exchanges, the same was not true, in this study, for vocal calls. In 
other words, these monkeys had a feedback from their own voluntary controlled 
call production, but they were never exposed, except during specific testing, to 
voluntary calls produced by others and to their associated facial expressions. 
Another possible explanation for the absence of mirror neurons for vocal calls is 
that they exist only for emotional vocalizations, in other brain areas. On the other 
hand, other studies clearly showed that in the superior temporal and prefrontal 
cortices of the macaque there are neurons coding listened species-specific 
vocalizations (Rauschecker et al. 1995; Ghazanfar et al. 2005; Romanski et al. 2005), 
apparently in absence of vocal production-related discharge. Although these 
perceptual responses could be simply the result of a high order sensory 
elaboration, it is also possible that in monkeys the acoustic input reaching frontal 
areas is not coupled yet with the motor representation of vocalizations, at 
difference with what occurs in other species, such as humans and songbirds 
(Pulvermüller et al. 2006; Prather et al. 2008). 
 These findings suggest that in monkey may exist, in the lateral part of the 
cortex, a primitive system for the voluntary control of phonation, anatomically 
embedded in that controlling hand and mouth goal-directed motor acts. Thus, it 
is plausible to propose that in a further evolutionary step, these two systems 
could have been integrated. This is, indeed, what has been found, at a behavioral 
level, in chimpanzees, in which communicative brachio-manual gestures are 
often accompanied by vocalization (see previous section). At the neurological 
level, the investigations on chimpanzees or other apes is by far more complex. 
However, in the last decades structural and functional neuroimaging studies in 
apes have provided relevant information concerning the neural control of 
vocalization and communicative gestures in relation to the possible homology 
with Broca’s area. First, it has been shown that in apes there is an asymmetry of 
the inferior frontal gyrus (Cantalupo et al. 2001, 2009; Keller et al. 2009) even 
though it remains to be clarified whether this effect is due to the contribution of 
gray and/or white matter (see Schenker et al. 2010). Second, it has been shown in 
chimpanzees that right-lateralized skillful hand behaviors correlate with left 
asymmetry of the hand field of precentral gyrus (Hopkins et al. 2010). Third, a 
PET study in chimpanzees demonstrated the activation of the homolog of Broca’s 
area during the production of communicative vocal and hand gestures (Taglia-
latela et al. 2008). This latter finding is important, because it suggests that, with 
respect to monkeys, the lateral frontal cortex (area 44 and 45) of chimpanzees 
(Fig. 1) can control brachio-manual communicative gestures, possibly in conjunc-
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tion with vocal production, and that this function is lateralized. Fourth, although 
indirectly related to communication, a recent PET study reported that a parieto-
frontal system is activated in chimpanzees during execution (performed without 
seeing its own hand) and observation of grasping actions (Hecht et al. 2011), 
giving support to the evolutionary continuity between monkey and human 
mirror system. Whether the chimpanzee’s mirror system is involved in 
communication still needs to be investigated. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1:  Location (in red color) of area F5 in the macaque monkey (A) and the proposed 
homologue areas in chimpanzee (B) and man (C). In the chimpanzee brain area 44 has been 
reconstructed based on the anatomical description of the sulci and contours made by several 
authors (Bailey et al. 1950; Keller et al. 2009; Schenker et al. 2010; Keller et al. 2011). Area 44 in 
the human brain has been defined according to Brodmann (1909). CS: central sulcus; ias: inferior 
arcuate sulsus; FOS: fronto-orbicular sulcus; IFS: inferior frontal sulcus; IPCS: inferior precentral 
sulcus; L: lateral sulcus; PCS: precentral sulcus. 
 
5.2. Hypothetical Transitions from Gestures to Language 
  
The achieved integration, at the apes phylogenetic level, between communicative 
brachio-manual gestures and vocalization, very likely has been preserved in the 
next evolutionary steps, even in the presence of a clear predominance of the pho-
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natory system. Although it is speculative to mark when the phonatory system 
reached an autonomous function, in modern humans, the tight observed con-
nection between spoken language and gestures (McNeill 1992; Goldin-Meadow 
1999) seems to testify an old common origin. This link is not just an evolutionary 
relic without a meaningful function, but enables individuals to possess an en-
riched multimodal communicative system. Although in some situations only 
vocal communication can be used, it is also true that under specific acoustic 
impairment conditions (i.e. in deaf people), gestures can assume the main role in 
communication (Capirci & Volterra 2008). A support to this role is given also by 
brain imaging studies showing an activation of the inferior frontal cortex in deaf 
people during production of meaningful signs (Petitto et al. 2000). 
 Interestingly, a wealth of work by Gentilucci and colleagues provided 
strong evidence for a reciprocal influence between hand actions/gestures and 
verbal production (Gentilucci & Corballis 2006). For example, they demonstrated 
that execution or observation of two different types of grasping (precision grip or 
whole hand prehension) while subjects were pronouncing syllables affected both 
lips kinematics and voice formants (Gentilucci et al. 2004). In another study they 
showed that in the contemporaneous production or observation of a hand 
symbolic gesture and a word, the kinematic parameters of the former were inhi-
bited by the latter, while voice spectra were enhanced by the gesture (Bernardis 
& Gentilucci 2006). From the findings of this latter study they conclude that 
spoken word and symbolic gesture can be coded as a single signal by a unique 
communication system and that this signal may represent the intention to engage 
a closer interaction with a hypothetical interlocutor. 
 Summing up, there is much evidence that language and gestures share a 
common motor code, thus supporting several theories proposing that at cortical 
level some of the properties and organization of the motor system have been 
exploited within the vocal domain (Rizzolatti & Arbib 1998; Arbib 2005; Fogassi 
& Ferrari 2007). In line with this, several brain imaging studies show a great 
degree of overlap of these two systems, in particular in the frontal lobe. The spa-
tial resolution limitation of these techniques does not allow, at present, to assess 
whether these two functions activate different anatomical subsectors within the 
frontal lobe. Even neurologically it is well known that higher order praxic and 
linguistic deficits can appear associated, but this is not consistent among patients, 
thus suggesting a partial independence of the two functions (De Renzi 1989). 
 Once a primitive communicative system based on an association between 
gestures and vocalization took place, a further step in both the motor and sensory 
development of this system probably occurred through the acquisition of a more 
sophisticated phonatory mechanism, which allowed the association of a gesture 
with a specific sound. At this stage of language evolution the possibility of 
creating a theoretically infinite set of combinations rendered the phonatory 
system alone more efficient than the previous vocal-gestural system. This stage 
was crucial for the development of a speech-based communicative system. 
 
5.3. Action Sequences and Syntax 
 
The idea of a possible similarity between the organization of actions and 
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syntactic structure is worth to investigate, in particular under the evolutionary 
perspective discussed in the previous sections. According to some linguists, 
syntax function can be defined as a regulator of language (Pinker & Jackendoff 
2005). One of the mechanisms belonging to this function is that of combining 
elements, i.e. words, hierarchically, into meaningful phrases. Similarly to 
syntactic structure, as shown by classical behavioral and psychophysical studies 
(Jeannerod 1988; Bernstein 1996; Rosenbaum et al. 2007), the ‘action’ is considered 
as the top level of the motor organization, and is formed by a sequence of motor 
acts. Motor acts are the basic constituents of the motor system endowed with a 
meaning (the motor goal), playing a role similar to that of words within a phrase. 
The hierarchical sequencing of motor acts into a specific action (for example, (a) 
grasping a piece of food, (b) bringing it to the mouth, and (c) biting it) aims to a 
superordinate behavioral goal (eating the food). If the order of the motor act is 
changed (e.g., biting the food with the mouth, bringing the hand to the mouth, 
and grasping the food with the hand: c–b–a) the action goal can change (take the 
food out of the mouth). Similarly, the meaning of a phrase is given by the 
sequential organization of words. By changing the position of the words in a 
sentence, its meaning changes or is lost. 
 With respect to the hierarchical organization of motor sequences, two main 
series of studies attempted to address this issue at the single neuron level. The 
first series assessed the responses of neurons in mesial cortices (pre-supplemen-
tary motor area, pre-SMA/F6 and supplementary motor area, SMA proper/F3) 
and prefrontal cortex while monkeys executed sequences of movements (Tanji 
2001; Tanji & Hoshi 2008), such as turning, pulling and pushing, or specific 
sequences of reaching movements, or a series of movements in a maze. These 
studies showed that the recorded neurons could code either the sequence, the 
order of a movement inside a sequence or the final location of a trajectory. 
Another series of studies, carried out in our laboratory (Fogassi et al. 2005; Bonini 
et al. 2011), assessed the responses of parietal and premotor neurons during 
execution and observation of natural action sequences. The results showed that 
grasping neurons of areas PFG or F5 can discharge differently depending on the 
specific action sequence in which the grasping is embedded (see Fig. 2 below). 
Notably, this differential response is shown also by mirror neurons during 
observation of grasping embedded in different action sequences performed by 
another individual. This latter series of data suggests that motor neurons of 
parietal and ventral premotor cortex are organized in motor chains, each coding 
a specific action goal. Within this organization, a neuron coding a given motor 
act can discharge differently according to the action sequence to which this act 
belongs. 
 Summing up, both the order of a motor series and the organization of a 
natural action sequence can be coded by cortical single neurons. The premotor-
parietal motor system plus the prefrontal cortex can provide a substrate for 
sequential organization and hierarchical combination of motor elements. We 
posit that such an organization has been exploited in other domains including 
some aspects of the syntactic structure of language (see also Fogassi & Ferrari 
2007). 
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Figure 2:  Top. Action sequence tasks. A transparent screen allowed the monkey to establish from 
the beginning which of the two action goals (eating or placing) had to be performed. Once the 
screen was removed (I) the monkey had to grasp a lid that covered a container (II), and then, after 
the removal of the lid, grasped an object inside the container in order to eating it (A) or placing it 
into another container (B) located near the mouth. Bottom. Activity of four neurons recorded from 
parietal area PFG during the task. Rasters and histograms representing neuronal activity is a-
ligned on the first (left) and second (right) grasping act performed by the monkey. Ordinate repre-
sents neuronal discharge in spikes/sec. Abscissae indicate time course. Modified from Bonini et al. 
(2011). 
 
 In humans it is more difficult to directly demonstrate the existence of a 
mechanism involved in organizing action sequences, although a few 
investigations attempted to explore this issue. In an fMRI study (Frey & Gerry 
2006) subjects had to just observe or to observe with the purpose to reproduce the 
constructions, by another individual, of multiparts objects, that required 
structured motor sequences. During the task the activated regions were inferior 
frontal and parietal cortices (part of the mirror system), dorsal premotor cortex 
and pre-SMA, plus subcortical motor structures. In the observation/imitation 
study by Buccino et al. (2004a), described in a previous section, in which subjects 
had to observe, in order to imitate, sequences of guitar chords performed by a 
model, the activation involved the parieto-frontal mirror system, the SMA and 
prefrontal cortex. Altogether, these areas seem to play a role in encoding the 
meaning of motor acts, in parsing the action sequence into its discrete motor 
elements and, vice versa, in constructing new actions starting from single motor 
acts.  
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 Since the first reports of Broca’s patients, the IFG region has been 
repetitively considered as having a crucial role in syntactic processing. However, 
although not denying this role, other studies provided information that make this 
picture more complex. In fact there are other areas such as, for example, superior 
temporal cortex, that are activated during syntactic processing. Moreover, the 
activation of IFG by syntactic construction involves also concurrent semantic 
coding. Lastly, this region appears to be more activated when the level of 
complexity of syntactic comprehension of the sentence is higher (see Gernsbacher 
& Kaschak 2003; Grodzinky & Friederici 2006). In addition, as it is clear also from 
the extension of the lesion in Broca’s aphasics, an important role is also played by 
nearby regions, such as, for example, the middle prefrontal cortex, located just 
medially to IFG, that probably provides this latter region with the working 
memory mechanism necessary for building and understanding long and complex 
sentences. Altogether, these reports indicate that within the IFG region, areas 
contribute to processing linguistic information beyond syntactic structure. This 
would be in agreement with the proposal that in the IFG region (BA 44, 45 and 
47) there are subsectors involved in phonology, syntax and semantics, that 
appear to be roughly organized along a caudal-to-rostral anatomical sequence, 
with a certain overlap between them (Bookheimer 2002; Hagoort 2005). 
 This type of organization of IFG region does not contradict its possible 
derivation from a system responsible for action organization. Indeed this latter 
requires, for its optimal functioning, a hierarchical structure, a precise order that 
makes the action sequence meaningful, and a coded semantics, that is observed 
both at the level of whole action and of the motor acts composing it, similarly to 
what it occurs for the meaning of a sentence and a word, respectively. In 
agreement with this, neuroimaging studies showed that IFG activation is higher 
when the meaning of a sentence depends not only from word meanings but also 
from the syntactic structure in which the words are ordered (Dapretto & Bok-
heimer 1999). On the other hand, other studies suggest that Broca’s area is 
involved in processing hierarchical structures in multiple domains of human cog-
nition (Thompson-Schill et al. 2005; Koechlin & Jubault 2006). Thus, although the 
transition from action to language could have been long and may have required a 
complex adjustment of the mechanisms involved in sequence organization, none-
theless the existence of a motor substrate endowed with a motor meaning, organ-
ized in chunks and accessible by visual and acoustic higher order input, seems an 
important prerequisite for both language construction and its comprehension. 
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